IOWA LABORATORIES FACILITIES

PHYSICAL SECURITY PLAN

Submitted pursuant to SF 439, Section 14

Iowa Department of Public Safety

Senate File 439 of the 80th General Assembly, Section 14(1) directed the Department of Public Safety to study the security needs for the Iowa Laboratories Facilities (ILF) and file a report of said study by December 15, 2003. The ILF includes the following facilities: DCI Criminalistics Laboratory, State Medical Examiner Laboratory, University of Iowa Hygienic Laboratory and the Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship Laboratories.

This report will describe the security measures that are being designed into the ILF and those additional security measures that are being considered by the ILF Team.

1. Purpose of Security.

   This report will identify the actions being implemented in the Iowa Laboratory Facilities (ILF) that will operate as combined measures for the detection, prevention and control of loss or damage to government and personal property due to theft, sabotage, civil disturbance, natural disaster or similar cause. Building security is meant to safeguard personnel, property and operations. Properly instituted, it prevents illegal access to equipment, buildings, material and documents. Adequate security will require the cooperation of all tenants as well as the identification of each tenant's activities, both within and outside the buildings.

2. Area Covered by Security.

   Since these are public buildings, there must be a balance between the need for public access and the need for security. The ILF comprises an area which includes five buildings and the surrounding parking and access roadways. Four of the buildings are connected via a covered walkway on the front. The fifth building, containing the Weights and Measures Bureau, is separated from the other four. These buildings consist of the following:

Agency	Square feet	No. of Employees
DCI Lab	57,000	50
Medical Examiner	26,000	18-24
Hygiene	25,000	70
Ag. Lab/Weights & Measures	34,000	30
Training Center	5,000	N/A

3. Critical Materials Covered by Security.

The materials needing protection include, but are not limited to, criminal evidence, cadavers, confidential and public records, personnel records, biohazard and radioactive substances, chemicals used for testing and a firearm reference file. In the event of an act of terrorism, each of the laboratories could be called upon to house substances which must be handled in specialized ways or contained in dedicated rooms.

4. ILF Designed Security Control Measures.

The entire facility has been designed using the principal of "setbacks." These setbacks ensure that unauthorized (non-employee) vehicles are kept at a distance to prevent attack by explosives and to reduce the requirements for blast-proof buildings. The windows are purposely set high in the outer walls, yet are designed to allow light into the labs, again to protect against direct penetration.

A perimeter security fence coupled with landscaping will be installed to further prevent unauthorized access onto the grounds or into the buildings. This fencing will be gated, with cameras, and can be opened either by employee access cards or for delivery people after they have been authorized by an employee. Deliveries will include evidence for law enforcement, chemical supplies, bodies for autopsy, weights, chemical/biological samples and mail or freight.

Air intake grills have been located to prevent purposeful contamination of the air inside the buildings.

The design of the buildings allows minimal opportunity to climb the walls and access the roof.

All aspects of building entry will be controlled except for the training center. The training center will have uncontrolled access, limited to the training area. No persons from the training center will have access to other areas unless they are escorted by an authorized employee.

Public access to the main entry area will be via intercom and escorted access. Persons needing to contact a specific agency will use a video intercom system located at the entry to identify themselves to the agency they desire to visit. They will then be escorted by a member of that agency into that portion of the facility.

Access to any area within a tenant facility will be controlled by key card access by authorized employees within that agency. The DCI Crime Lab will be the overall administrator of the card access system, with individual agencies having programming control of their own facility within their own access guidelines. The following is an outline of the card access plan:

A. Each agency will establish guidelines pertinent to areas under the control of that agency.

(1) Authority for access.

Administrative authority will be located in the DCI Crime Lab with lower authority levels given to each agency for programming access of each employee on their Table of Organization. Each agency will be responsible for inventory control of access cards and all aspects of card access programming for each card issued. Card access for each agency will work only within the areas of the specific agency programming the card.

(2) Access criteria for:

a. Agency personnel.
To be governed by specific agency policy.

b. Visitors.
To be governed by agency being visited and ILF overall access policy.

c. General Services Maintenance personnel.
To be governed by agency being visited and ILF overall access policy.

d. Contractor personnel.
To be governed by agency being visited and ILF overall access policy.

e. Police/Fire/Emergency Personnel.
To be governed by agency being visited and ILF overall access policy. For after-hours and emergency access, there will be a Knox-Box Rapid Entry System located in entry areas.

B. Identification and Control.

(1) The identification system for employees will be tied into the access control system, allowing for access control to identify the employee entering. This system will be similar to that used on the Capitol Complex to allow for programming of agency personnel who will need access and travel between the Capitol Complex and the ILF.

(2) This system will establish a computer log of personnel access to the ILF (date, time, area, building, etc.)

C. Vehicle control.

(1) There will be three gated access areas surrounding the ILF.

a. DCI parking and evidence control area
b. Medical Examiner delivery and parking area
c. AG/Hygiene/Weights and Measures delivery area

(2) Access by privately owned and delivery vehicles will be controlled by each ILF agency.

D. Protective lighting system.

Exterior lighting will be automatically controlled via sensors and will be located in walkways, parking and in public and non-public areas at the front and rear of the complex. Each ILF tenant has identified the areas which are to be illuminated in the event of a power failure. There is currently no provision for a back-up generator.

E. Intrusion Detection Systems.

Each tenant facility will be equipped with internal intrusion detection systems, including door alarms, cameras, motion detectors, etc., commonly found in these types of buildings. Within each tenant's facility, there are some areas requiring greater security measures. These have been addressed. An intrusion will set off an alarm and generate a call to a central security/law enforcement agency. Alarm protocol will be established by each tenant with at least one supervisor being designated to respond when the alarm "calling tree" is activated.

F. Off-Site Monitors.

State Patrol Post 16 (State Patrol security of the Capitol Complex) has the capacity to record data from installed security cameras throughout the Complex. This capability extends to the cameras installed at the ILF. Although there is insufficient staff at Post 16 to monitor security cameras, the Post has a sizeable recording system which allows for storage of recorded security camera images. This system will be useful for investigative purposes in the event of an attempted break-in at the ILF. However, this system is not an effective intervention aid.

G. Patrol of the Area.

There are two agencies with patrol capabilities/functions on the Des Moines Area Community College (DMACC) Campus.

The first is DMACC Security, which is comprised largely of personnel hired from Securitas Security Services (formerly Pinkerton's), who regularly patrol the campus. These officers are trained in basic medical emergency procedures and are on patrol twenty-fours hours a day/seven days a week. In the event they are alerted to a traffic accident, medical emergency, crime or a fire, they would contact the Ankeny Police Department or Fire Department to direct them to the incident. DMACC Security could patrol the ILF, but their officers would have to be given gate passes to enter the facility roads. One or two patrols per night would be sufficient.

The second agency is the Ankeny Police Department whose authority extends to DMACC if necessary. A routine patrol of the ILF by Ankeny police officers is possible, again, with the appropriate access card(s). However, at this time, due to Ankeny budget constraints and a shortage of officers, there is no guarantee of a regular visit by Ankeny officers. Although their patrols will be random, this is deemed to be adequate because they could respond to an emergency very quickly. Each Ankeny officer carries an AED for heart attack victims. It is recommended that each ILF tenant agency purchase its own AED as well.

5. Emergency Operations.

In the event of a large emergency operation which affects Federal agencies and the Iowa National Guard, the DMACC campus is a designated staging area. This will enhance the security of the ILF during a time of crisis.

Conclusions and Recommendations.

1. It has come to the attention of the ILF Team that some Homeland Security money may be available for security upgrades. A proposal has been submitted for review by the Emergency Management Division (EMD). The upgrades proposed considerably enhance the security of the facility and are not presently provided by the security line item in the overall budget. The following additions to the security package are recommended for serious consideration:

   a. Upgrade of security fence from chain link to steel pickets.

   b. Additional steel fencing around the site.

   c. Guardhouse at the entrance road (pad and wiring already installed).

   d. Two additional electronic gates.

   e. Two additional CCTV cameras at the guardhouse.

   f. Glass break detectors throughout the facility.

g. Additional motion detectors.

h. Four additional CCTV cameras with motion sensors in the DCI evidence room.

i. Motion detectors above the ceiling at the DCI facility.

j. All key locks replaced with digital combination locks in the DCI facility.

k. Biometric pass system instead of coded access (more secure) in the DCI facility.

2. There may be a need (the State Medical Examiner, for example) for access to a building after hours for delivery of special evidence or a body for autopsy. In the case of evidence for the DCI, it will be handled by DCI personnel called to the building to allow access. If a body were to be delivered to the SME, it would be possible, due to their specific building design for a third party to be granted access to the SME facility after hours.

   Arrangements for these after-hours access needs will be made by each agency with either DMACC Security or, perhaps, the Ankeny Police Department. It is noted, however, that it would not be the best use of an officer's time to be "on-call" for any given agency.

It is hoped that this document has given the reader an adequate picture of the security measures that are in place for the Iowa Laboratories Facility. The Facility Team believes that the design goal of making this facility as independently secure as possible has been achieved. Minimal outside patrols should be necessary to finish the security plan. Adequate public access exists in harmony with employee and building safety.